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GLENN BOWMAN
The radical closure of Gaza serves here as an extreme example of a process of
isolation and immiseration of national enemies that is deeply rooted in Israeli
ideology and practices of state formation. I use encystation to reveal the dual
meaning of the term—that of radical isolation of diseased elements and that of
protecting a fetus within a womb—and to show how the two meanings connect
with respective Israeli policies toward Palestinians and Jews. I suggest in closing
that the Oslo Accords have put in place mechanisms for the future imposition
on West Bank Palestinians of the same containment currently afflicting Gaza.*
Introduction
Cyst: 1. Biology. A thin walled hollow organ or cavity in an animal body (or plant) . . .
2. Pathology. A closed cavity or sac of a morbid or abnormal character . . . 3. Biol. or
Cryptogamic Botany. A cell or cavity containing reproductive bodies, embryos, etc. . . .
(Oxford English Dictionary)
A cyst is a closed sac, having a distinct membrane and division compared to the nearby tissue.
Basically, a cyst is a cluster of cells that have grouped together to form a sac (not unlike the manner
in which water molecules group together, forming a bubble); however, the distinguishing aspect of
a cyst is the cells forming the “shell” of such a sac, being distinctly abnormal (in both appearance
and behavior) when compared to all surrounding cells for that given location. It may contain air,
fluids, or semi-solid material. Once formed, a cyst may sometimes resolve on its own. Whether a
cyst that fails to resolve may need to be removed by surgery will depend on what type of cyst it is
and where in the body it has formed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyst).
AS I WRITE in January 2015, the Egyptian government under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is completing
the extension from five hundred to one thousand meters of a free-fire buffer zone at the Egyptian-
Gazan border. This erstwhile construction (which involves the destruction of at least twelve hundred
* I want to express my appreciation to Helga Tawil-Souri and Dina Matar whose forthcoming Gaza as
Metaphor (London: Hurst Publishers, 2015) provided the original impetus for writing this paper
(a version of which will appear in their book).
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houses in Rafah) consolidates the process of closure of Gaza, which the military regime inaugurated
soon after coming to power, canceling the previous government’s policy of permanently opening the
Rafah crossing to movement in and out of Gaza. Al-Sisi’s buffer zone links up with the “shell” Israel
has—since its early efforts at walling Gaza in 1991—built up around the whole of Gaza, incorporating
palisades, fences, three-hundred-meter buffer zones (these expropriating Gazan land unlike their
Egyptian equivalents that are on Egyptian territory), naval blockades, air space closure, and sealed
gates. Israel has, with the connivance of Egypt, literally enclosed the population of Gaza within a
sac; this short essay will examine the metaphorical implications of that “encystation”—
metaphorical implications with deep historical roots and very literal consequences.
Encystation is the process of enclosing within a cyst and the encirclement of Palestinian
communities within the territories over which Israel claims sovereignty is indisputably an act of
quarantining “matter” held to put the surrounding social body at risk. Although Israel, as now
Egypt, claims that walling is a matter of security (the prevention of Palestinian attacks on Israeli
civilians in the former case,1 the prevention of Salafist entries into Egyptian territory from Gaza in
the latter), encystation is—at least in the Israeli instance—a long-standing practice that works to
very different ends on both the Palestinian and Israeli populations. In this short paper, I will use the
term encystation rather than Frederick Boal’s “encapsulation” and Mary Douglas’s “enclavement”2
as encystation brings a metaphorics of the body into my descriptions of political practices and, in
so doing, resonates with discourses of infection and disease, as well as of propagation and growth,
both of which are deeply embedded in Israeli conceptions of national self and other.
The Question of Borders
The use of the metaphor encystation to describe Israeli practices draws on the idea that the
“shell” surrounding encysted materials is analogous to the walls3 Israel erects to divide Israeli and
Palestinian populations. Walling is an act of asserting and enforcing borders, and an examination
of the concept of border in Israeli discourse enables us to assess differences in the practices of
walling as they are applied to Gaza, the West Bank, and Palestinians in Israel,4 as well as both
Israel proper and Israeli settlements.
The concept of border has been both central to, and multivalent in, Israeli practice and discourse
since the early days of the state, as Adriana Kemp has shown in her study of the role of the border
and of military border violations in the shaping of Israeli identity. Kemp contends that “the
territorialist idiom of settlement, which presented the boundary as the ultimate symbol of state
sovereignty, did not take root in the Israeli mind. The army gradually initiated practices which
transferred activity to the other side of the border . . . [so that] the breaching of the border
became a symbolic practice, a genuine territorial ritual, which had the effect of both trivializing
the border and instilling a sense of lordship over the territories across the lines.”5 Kemp details
cross-border violations in the period when the West Bank was in Jordanian hands (although a
favorite Israeli destination for the incursions of that period was Petra, well to the east of the
Jordan River). In the period she discusses (1949–57), border crossings by the Israeli military were
designed to punish Palestinian communities for allowing attempts to access Israel by refugees
(who, for the most part, were trying to return to houses and properties from which they had been
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forced out in the course of the 1948 war and subsequent so-called mopping-up operations): crossing
of the lines by the Palestinians was portrayed as a “gross violation of the armistice agreements” and
was called infiltration. However, when border-crossing became a habit of the Israeli army, even if
unacknowledged, it was known as “routine security measures” and depicted as part of the attempt
to achieve what was termed border discipline.6 Michel Warschawski, in his excellent On the
Border, writes that “in May 1966, while out hiking with some friends, I wound up in Jordan
without knowing it, and it was an Israeli patrol that brought us back to the railway zone, an
extraterritorial zone, and made us get on the next train. None of us even questioned then what an
Israeli patrol was doing inside Jordanian territory.”7
The “frontierist” conception of borders that Kemp claims characterized Israeli attitudes
toward state and sovereignty following the 1948 war is still in play in Israeli state policies not
only toward Lebanon and Syria but also with regard to the illegally occupied territories of the
West Bank, the Golan Heights and (until recently) the Gaza Strip. In all these places, the state
establishes settlements, builds roadways and other infrastructural facts on the ground, and
maintains the citizenship of extraterritorial settlers. Settlements are simultaneously “walled in”
to protect them from surrounding Palestinian communities, and connected—by Jewish only
bypass roads—to Israeli territory so as to in effect superimpose a continuous Israel over West
Bank Palestine.8
At the same time, Palestinians are always susceptible to being “walled off” from their
surroundings. This is strikingly manifest in the operations of the so-called Border Police, a police
unit under the command of the Israeli military that is supposed to patrol borders as well as ports
and airports. In practice, the Border Police go into operation wherever Palestinians confront
Israelis in what the authorities perceive as a political manner.
When Ariel Sharon’s 28 September 2000 ostensible visit to Haram al-Sharif (which provoked the
second intifada) sparked demonstrations in Arab towns and cities within Israel’s 1949 borders, it was
the Border Police that was sent into the Galilee to suppress these, at the cost of thirteen Israeli Arabs,
that is, Palestinians, shot dead. Borders, whether those drawn by the separation wall or those of Israel’s
self-styled “closed military areas” that any officer can declare at whim, pertain to Palestinians, and are
erected wherever and whenever a Palestinian is seen to impinge upon or question Israeli sovereignty
over the land. As is evidenced by Israel’s incursions into Gaza and the West Bank to assassinate
activists or arrest government ministers, as well as its numerous invasions of Lebanon, and most
recently its (18 January 2015) air strike on the Syrian Golan Heights, a similar logic operates: Arabs
must remain passive and in place while the Israeli military can go anywhere it wants to ensure that
quiescent immobility.
If borders for Israelis exist in large part for what Kemp calls the “symbolic practice” of breaching
them, how then does one discern the limits of the land of Israel? This question concerns not only the
legal rights of settlers to benefits accruing from Israeli citizenship, which are refused their Arab
neighbors in the occupied territories. It also has extraterritorial applications. Israel’s Law of Return
5710-1950 promises that “every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh [an
immigrant],”9 which in practice has come to mean that any person claiming to be a Jew, either by
descent or conversion, is granted automatic citizenship as well as guaranteed housing, full tuition
for language and university education, and significant discounts on cars, appliances, and other
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aids to settlement.10 Beyond, however, easing aliyah [immigration], the Law of Return implies that,
by virtue of being Jewish, Jews outside Israel are in effect always-already Israeli citizens.
In line with the effective extension of Israeli state sovereignty this guarantee of automatic
citizenship entails, Israel has, in the past few years, intervened in cases in which Jews were on trial
for crimes committed outside of Israel, as though these were cases in which its own citizens were
being tried by a foreign state. It has also organized massive so-called rescue missions in Iraq, Iran,
and Ethiopia to take Jewish citizens of other countries out of those countries and ostensibly
resettle them in Israel. If Israeli sovereignty is extensible to anywhere Jews exist, then there are in
effect no borders constraining Israel’s population.
Gaza and the West Bank are clearly delineated by borders, marked by the aforementioned eight-
meter-high wall as well as buffered and ditched fences (effectively sealing the territories to
Palestinians but leaving them permeable to military assault from Israel and, in the case of the
West Bank, to the free movement of settlers). The logics of encystation operate differently in
the two cases, however, and I will investigate the operative and conceptual differences between the
two applications by examining the relevance to both Gaza and the West Bank of the concept of
the sovereign exception.
Sovereign Exception
The Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben, in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life,
speculates on the extraterritoriality of persons excluded from the conceptual and legal domain of
the nation-state within which they nonetheless live. Unlike the diasporic extraterritoriality of
persons or communities belonging to a national collectivity but located outside national territory
(such as Israeli settlers or Jews outside Israel), the “outside inside” that Agamben examines is
exemplified by the situation of detainees in Guantanamo Bay. These who “do not have the status
of Prisoners of War, they have absolutely no legal status. They are subject now only to raw power;
they have no legal existence.”11 These detainees, who Agamben explicitly compares with Jews in
the Nazi camps, are held within the embrace of the state but without the protection that state
affords its citizens:
The exception that defines the structure of sovereignty is . . . complex. Here what is outside is in-
cluded not simply by means of an interdiction or an internment, but rather by means of the sus-
pension of the juridical order’s validity—by letting the juridical order, that is, withdraw from the
exception and abandon it. The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule,
suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception,
first constitutes itself as a rule. The particular “force” of law consists in this capacity of law to
maintain itself in relation to an exteriority. We shall give the name relation of exception to the
extreme form of relation by which something is included solely through its exclusion.12
As was the case for those imprisoned in the concentration camps at the core of Agamben’s
argument, the withdrawal of the juridical order from the Palestinians, so to speak, behind the wall,
is not a matter of disregard but one of dehumanization (the production of what Agamben terms
bare life, which can be defined as “life exposed to death” at the hands of sovereign violence).13
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The enclosed populations that result are carefully regarded—profiled, branded with identity cards,
confined to specified areas, tracked—while simultaneously being denied the rights or legal status
accruing to citizens of the incorporating state. The encysted are brought far more under the
control of the state than its citizens but, rather than enjoying protection by the state correlative to
that control, stand in constant risk of extermination by it.
For Agamben, this construction of an inside (the sovereign juridical order of the state) by the
inclusion of an excluded population (the threatening other) is a central rhetorical (and practical)
move by modern sovereign powers. This interiorization of a national exteriority not only provides
its citizenry with evidence of the protective power of the state but simultaneously establishes that
state’s demands to increase its power over, and reduce the rights of, that citizenry on the grounds
that the incorporated other presents a threat.14
Yehouda Shenhav and Yael Berda, Israeli scholars of the bureaucracy of occupation, commend
the analytic grip of the concept of sovereign exception, but query its apparent lack of a genealogy
(or ahistoricism) and, in rectifying that, show how it evolved in British colonial practice under
Lord Evelyn Cromer in Egypt and Lord George Curzon in India, and also how its application by
the British and later the Israelis changed from the Mandate period until the wake of the second
intifada. Constant to the sovereign exception’s colonial application is the assumption of the
potentially violent irrationality of the colonial subject and the consequent necessity of revealing
colonial sovereignty to that subject as “a phantom organ that manufactures miraculous decisions,
but that conceals the locus of the decision making process, the inner working of its machinery,
and its criteria of judgment.”15 That sovereignty, in other words, manifests itself as a
simultaneously illegible and irresistible power. In the contemporary Israeli instance, racialized
profiling of the Palestinian is “based on an all-powerful instant classification as security threat . . .
rel[ying] on the belief that inside every Palestinian—regardless of age, residence or profession—
hides the ghost or demon of a Palestinian terrorist.”16 Earlier instances of profiling acknowledged
that inherent violent irrationality but they were accompanied by different strategies for bringing it
under control.
Historically, the face that the sovereign exception shows to the subject population will very much
depend on that population’s perceived use value. As Neve Gordon shows, Israeli policy between the
1967 occupation and the first intifada was that of employing “numerous forms of control to craft an
economically useful Palestinian society while reducing the inhabitants’ political aptitude.”17With the
first intifada, Israel radically curtailed its dependence on Palestinian labor and simultaneously
withdrew from managing Palestinian civil life, shifting “the governing paradigm . . . to control of
the Palestinian population seen from the single vantage point of ‘Israel’s security.’”18 Although
orders were given to the military to avoid killing civilians, Israel emphasized its sovereignty over
the Palestinians through “the implementation of the entry-permit regime and the pervasive
practice of incarceration, torture and beatings in order to repress the population’s political
aspirations.”19 However, with the second intifada, “Israel adopted a new approach toward the
Palestinians which rendered them, in many respects, expendable . . . In place of the politics of life
that had characterized the occupied territories until the second intifada, a politics of death slowly
emerged. The paradigmatic practice of this new politics is the extrajudicial execution which in
contrast to incarcerations or even torture does not intend to shape or alter Palestinian behavior,
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but to do away with “recalcitrant” individuals.”20 Gordon notes the escalation of killings of
Palestinians after September 2000 (the number of Palestinian fatalities during each year of the
second, or al-Aqsa, intifada was more than all of those killed during the first twenty years of the
occupation), an escalation highlighted by Israel’s savage attacks on Gaza in 2008–9, 2012, and
2014 (dubbed Operations Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense, and Protective Edge; see JPS 151, 167, and
173). Concurrent with the institutionalization of assassinations and other forms of extermination
of Palestinian militants was a policy of weakening the general population so as to sap its will to
resistance, as infamously spelt out by prime ministerial aide Dov Weissglass in 2006. Based on
Defense Ministry research into minimal daily caloric needs, the new policy would take the Gazan
population to the edge of, but not into, starvation—“the idea,” Weissglass said, “is to put the
Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger.”21
The path mapped here between valuing a subject population as a labor pool and judging it
expendable and collateral to the extermination of resistance activities traces the development of
Israeli policy toward Gazans from surveilled incorporation to the isolated “bare life” of the camp.
A Matter of Degree
I initially assumed22 that there was a qualitative difference between the walling of Gaza and that
of theWest Bank insofar as the encystation of Gaza seemedmuchmore brutal and all-encompassing
than that of the West Bank. Gaza’s wall tightly encysts a population that is exclusively Palestinian
and the area is, aside from military incursions, closed to Israelis. Israeli policies, not to mention
invasions and bombardments, have effectively destroyed the economy, radically restricting the
provision of water, electricity, and, as mentioned above, food. The expendability of the Gazan
population was made very clear in Operations Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense, and Protective Edge
through Israeli willingness to destroy occupied apartment blocks in putative pursuit of Hamas or
Islamic Jihad militants as well as, on 1 August 2014, the decision to raze an entire neighborhood,
killing its inhabitants, so as to preempt the feared incarceration of a captured Israeli soldier. The
West Bank wall appears to operate according to a different logic in drawing a border between
Israel and the West Bank (a border that massively violates the 1949 armistice line but only so as
to expropriate Palestinian territory) and allowing, within that border, a significant degree of
mobility as well as the supply of (mostly Israeli) goods and services to West Bank Palestinians.
What Gordon refers to as the politics of death is not there endemic; although assassinations and
targeted killings—both at the hands of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and militant settlers—are
far from infrequent, collateral damage is nowhere near as extensive as it is in Gaza. However,
further investigation of the implications of post-Oslo developments has shown that Israeli policies
are fundamentally the same for both areas but that Gaza is further along the road to encystation
and bare life than the West Bank. The difference is temporal rather than qualitative.
Oslo II (1995) divided the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) into three administrative
divisions: Areas A, B, and C. Area A was designated as being under full civil and security control
by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and closed to Israelis other than Israeli security forces on raids
against militants. Joint Israeli and Palestinian policing would take care of security concerns in
Area B, although all civil issues (water, electricity, sewage, health provision, education, and so
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forth) pertaining to Palestinians living in Area B would be the exclusive concern of the PA. Area C
was placed under full Israeli security and civil control. The Interim Agreement, signed by Yitzhak
Rabin and Yasir Arafat under the aegis of the U.S. president, Bill Clinton, stated that areas B and C
would, aside from concessions to be negotiated, be handed to full Palestinian control in the wake
of the permanent status agreements. In the subsequent two decades, no moves toward any
agreement over permanent status have been reached23 and, insofar as it is evident that Israeli state
policy is to ensure that no such moves can occur, it is important to investigate the status quo of
areas A, B, and C.
Area A, under full civil and security control of the PA, makes up no more than 3 percent of
the West Bank,24 and is effectively the territories occupied by the major cities: Bethlehem,
Jericho, Ramallah, Qalqilya, Tulkarm, Jenin, Nablus and 80 percent of Hebron (the remainder
of which is designated settler property). East Jerusalem, annexed by the Israelis in 1980, is not
included, and although the agreement referred to the cities and their “surrounding areas,” the
latter are continually being encroached on and expropriated by settlement expansion, road-
building, and the declaration of closed military zones. In the Bethlehem district, the wall has
voraciously bitten off olive groves and agricultural lands right up to the edges of the inhabited
areas. The aquifers underlying the region have been tapped by the Israelis for supplying water
to Jerusalem and the surrounding settlements, and Palestinians are not allowed to draw from
them. Although Israeli civilians are legally forbidden from entering Area A (which impedes
not only contacts between Israeli peace activists and Palestinians but also economic
interaction—supply and services—between the two populations), settlers and soldiers make
frequent incursions into the regions.
Area B makes up 24 percent of the West Bank and contains some 450 Palestinian villages and
their surrounding lands. In this region, civil affairs are purely the concern of the PA while what is
termed security is the joint concern of the PA and the Israeli military. The protocols, appended to
the interim agreement, point out, however, that “the [Palestinian] Council will assure responsibility
for public order for the Palestinians. Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for
the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.”25
The PA, in other words, polices the Palestinian population but steps aside to make way for
intervention by the IDF when Palestinian activities are seen to threaten Israelis or Israel’s security
concerns; such activities include responses by Palestinians to attacks by settlers on individuals or
communities and civilian resistance to settlement expansion onto Palestinian lands. Settlements,
nominally restricted to Area C, frequently expand into Area B, expropriating private lands for
building or cultivation and sparking local resistance that is then suppressed by the IDF.26
Area C is by far the largest portion of theWest Bank, making up approximately 73 percent of the
whole. Some 68 percent of this is allotted to settlements and their lands, 21 percent is designated as
closed military zones, and 8 percent is dedicated as nature reserves. The entire region is under Israeli
civil and security control, but the civil administration applies solely to the 341,000 resident settlers
leaving a substantial majority of the 300,000 Palestinians who live there without connection to the
water network, blocked from building by restrictions on Palestinian construction, and deprived of
basic amenities such as schooling and medical facilities.27 Palestinian movement through Area C
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is fiercely monitored and restricted by a permit system, permanent and so-called flying checkpoints,
roadblocks, and settler-only roads.
In effect, despite the impression that the West Bank is “encysted” as a unit within the apartheid
wall (the Palestinian term) or separation barrier (the Israeli one), the facts on the ground reveal that
the region is itself shattered into a multitude of discontinuous Palestinian cysts encompassed by
Israeli territory under the sovereignty of a combination of Israeli state military and armed settlers.
As the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) argued
strongly already in May 2006, it is difficult to any longer speak of the West Bank as an entity:
“A combination of checkpoints, physical obstacles and a permit system has effectively cut the
West Bank into three distinct areas. . . . Within these areas further enclaves have been created—
also bordered by checkpoints and roadblocks—that has led to one Palestinian community being
isolated from its neighbour.”28 Here the vast majority of the 2,731,052 resident Palestinians live
amid 341,400 settlers29 on 27 percent of the land with only 3 percent of that territory under
complete civil and security governance by the PA. The speed and efficiency with which Israeli
troops are able to impose full closure on the cities and towns of the West Bank was first
demonstrated during the reconquest of the West Bank in the course of the second intifada of
2000, while the militarization of Areas B and C by a combination of the IDF and settlers renders
the villages in those regions highly susceptible to expulsions in the event of Israeli perceptions that
they, or Palestinians in general, pose heightened security threats. The current state of affairs, in
which right-wing nationalist provocations by Israel threaten to spark a third intifada, could well
bring about such actions at any time, especially in the light of Israeli saber-rattling toward Iran
and the general tumult of the Middle East. Were that to happen, the situation of Gaza could easily
be reproduced in the urban areas of the West Bank with open warfare on an encysted population
swollen by refugees flooding into the cities of Area A from the villages of Areas B and C.
What I have sketched above might be seen as an apocalyptic scenario, and there are forces at
play—even though they appear to be fairly muted in the current Israeli climate—which are
working against its possibility. It is important, however, to stress that the groundwork is very
much in place to allow its enactment when Israeli politicians judge that the time is right. Gaza,
like the Gazan population, has been judged expendable by Israel; its groundwater is salinated
and heavy with pollutants and it does not have the biblical aura that makes the Zionist Judea
so desirable to religious ethnonationalists. It would be difficult—politically, practically, and
ideologically—to do with the people of the West Bank what has been done with those of Gaza
(so many of whom are themselves refugees, or descendants of refugees, from the ethnic
cleansing of the territory that became 1949 Israel) but this may simply be a matter of waiting
for the opportune moment. At present, escalating outward migration, particularly of those with
the potential to build a viable Palestinian entity to counter Israel’s project,30 is quietly carrying
out the labor of politicide while the encirclement and etiolation of those that remain work to
fragment the sense of national community, replacing aspirations for self-determination and
national sovereignty with the simple will to survive. The question of whether and when Israel
will opt for surgical intervention depends on many factors, but the equipment for removing the
cyst is already at hand.
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Imperial Sovereignty
I return, in closing, to the concept of encystation. Like the term border in Israeli discourse and
that of extraterritorial, which I have used in this paper, cyst has a double meaning: it is both a
closed sac in which morbid matter is quarantined so as to protect the surrounding body and a
“cell containing an embryo” that provides a defensive membrane within which that fetal entity
can develop until it has grown sufficiently strong to emerge into the world outside. It is in the
latter sense that Israel, as a homeland for the Jewish people, was conceptualized by Herzl and the
late nineteenth-century Zionist pioneers who saw the land as a place distant from Europe and its
anti-Semitism where Jews, weakened by centuries of discrimination, could shelter while
developing into what Herzl termed “real men.”31
Unsurprisingly, as a protected space within which a people could shelter and grow strong
without encountering debilitating competition and challenges, Israel’s founders envisaged not only
the need for strong defenses against an “outside” but also means for ensuring that any internal
challenge to the development of sovereignty would be contained, expelled, or destroyed.32
Modern-day Israel, which—with its massive army, its nuclear capabilities, and its high-tech
economy—certainly has entered forcefully into the global community of mature states,
nonetheless still conceives of itself as a protective womb for a fetal people. As a result it encysts
non-Jewish populations within the territory over which it imposes de facto sovereignty, refusing
them even the semblance of self-determination,33 while simultaneously extending its protective
wall outward so as to encompass and protect all the members of a globally distributed
ethnoreligious population it sees as its concern. Like the United States which, with the demise of
the Soviet Union, assumes its right to celebrate its power to defend its citizens and its interests
everywhere, Israel has, with its victories over the antagonisms against which it established itself,
become unrestrained in its will to sovereign power both within and beyond its borders. It is
hardly surprising that this sovereign power becomes, in effect, genocidal against populations such
as those within the cyst of Gaza that Israel’s religio-nationalist ideology increasingly defines as
inferior, threatening, and expendable.
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